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		<title>Release Meeting Minutes/2012-01-24 - Revision history</title>
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		<updated>2026-05-14T17:25:43Z</updated>
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		<id>https://k5wiki.test.kerberos.org/wiki?title=Release_Meeting_Minutes/2012-01-24&amp;diff=4532&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>TomYu: New page: {{minutes|2012}} Will Fiveash, Thomas Hardjono, Greg Hudson, Simo Sorce, Zhanna Tsitkova, Tom Yu  == gss_export_cred == Simo suggests a new API for exporting GSS creds. ;Greg: Might be usi...</title>
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				<updated>2012-01-24T19:14:52Z</updated>
		
		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;New page: {{minutes|2012}} Will Fiveash, Thomas Hardjono, Greg Hudson, Simo Sorce, Zhanna Tsitkova, Tom Yu  == gss_export_cred == Simo suggests a new API for exporting GSS creds. ;Greg: Might be usi...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{minutes|2012}}&lt;br /&gt;
Will Fiveash, Thomas Hardjono, Greg Hudson, Simo Sorce, Zhanna Tsitkova, Tom Yu&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
== gss_export_cred ==&lt;br /&gt;
Simo suggests a new API for exporting GSS creds.&lt;br /&gt;
;Greg: Might be using a memory ccache or a file. Would have to serialize contents.&lt;br /&gt;
;Simo: To use in GSS proxy.&lt;br /&gt;
;Tom: consider e.g. nonexportable keys in hardware security modules&lt;br /&gt;
;Simo: Stateless server for GSS proxy. Server could encrypt credentials in a long-term key to hand to the client.&lt;br /&gt;
;Tom: So externalizing server state to client without client using them.&lt;br /&gt;
;Simo: Also possibly for clients to use.&lt;br /&gt;
;Greg: Resource consumptino... encryption, memory.&lt;br /&gt;
;Simo: Also thinking about exporting partially initialized context.&lt;br /&gt;
;Greg: See also IETF GSS preauth proposal.&lt;br /&gt;
;Tom: Is statelessness a requirement?&lt;br /&gt;
;Simo: Denials of service, memory leaks, etc. make stateless attractive.&lt;br /&gt;
;Tom: Consider replays, reordering, etc.&lt;br /&gt;
;Greg: Maybe 1.11, but we're not committing to anything just yet.&lt;br /&gt;
;Simo: Standards?&lt;br /&gt;
;Greg: Not for the token format.&lt;br /&gt;
;Tom: Standards for API.&lt;br /&gt;
;Simo: Use Kerberos initially... maybe GSS-EAP later?&lt;br /&gt;
;Greg: Also define whether API or caller is responsible for encrypting the token.&lt;br /&gt;
== verify_init_creds ==&lt;br /&gt;
;Will: Started thread based on talking to a customer. Hostnames change. pam_krb5 in auth stack. Why not try every principal in the keytab?&lt;br /&gt;
;Greg: Say system keytab has both host and http keys. Other keytab (containing only http key) readable by httpd could fake any principal.&lt;br /&gt;
;Greg: Maybe try all or first &amp;quot;host&amp;quot; principal in keytab.&lt;br /&gt;
;Tom: Either could be a krb5-1.10.x bugfix.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>TomYu</name></author>	</entry>

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